Obama Stops Making Sense

May 6, 2009

Maybe Obama didn’t like the negative publicity of today’s voucher rally in DC.  Maybe he was tired of being regularly beat up in the pages of the Washington Post and Wall Street Journal.  Whatever it was, administration officials announced today that they will seek to “grandfather” all 1,700 current voucher students in the program until they graduate high school.

On the one hand, this is a victory for the voucher advocates and shows that their efforts have been effective.  On the other hand, this is a clever political move for Obama that allows him to kill the DC voucher program without paying the political price of denying low-income kids access to a program that the official evaluation has deemed beneficial.  Just because he’s not ripping this opportunity out of the hands of the existing 1,700 students doesn’t mean that he’s not ripping it out of the hands of every future student who could benefit from it.

Grandfathering in the existing students may be humane and politically savvy, but it is also logically incoherent.  If the program helps kids then why not let future students into the program so that they could also be helped?  If the program doesn’t help kids, why let these 1,700 continue in it?  For an administration that prides itself on its commitment to science and doing whatever works regardless of ideology or predisposition, they sure seem like Clintonian political triangulators completely impervious to evidence or common sense.

Besides, even to get the grandfathering we have to move the congressional democrats, led by rocket scientist Dick Durbin (who attended and whose children attended private schools).

(edited for typos)


Details on DC Voucher Rally

May 5, 2009

Here are the details on the DC Voucher rally that was in Bill McGurn’s piece in the WSJ today:

“Tomorrow afternoon at 1 o’clock in Washington, we’ll learn if anything has changed. Two groups — D.C. Children First and D.C. Parents for School Choice — are holding a rally at Freedom Plaza, just across from the offices of the city government. As their flier explains, “D.C. families deserve the same kind of choices that the Mayor, City Council Members, and Federal leaders with children have.”

It ought to make for an interesting event. In addition to Mr. Chavous and former mayor (current D.C. council member) Marion Barry, speakers will include former mayor Anthony Williams — whose leadership played a pivotal role in establishing the Opportunity Scholarships five years ago. Mr. Chavous also says there will be figures from black entertainment, as well as moms and dads and schoolchildren.”


The Wall Street Journal Strikes Again

May 5, 2009

The Wall Street Journal has another strong editorial today condemning Barack Obama and Arne Duncan’s hypocrisy in seeking to end the D.C. voucher program.  Here’s a highlight:

“See if you can follow this political syllogism. President Obama and his Education Secretary have repeatedly promised to support “what works,” regardless of ideology. The teachers unions adamantly oppose school vouchers, whether or not they work. Ergo, Messrs. Obama and Duncan decide to end a D.C. school voucher program that works and force poor kids back into schools where Messrs. Obama and Duncan would never send their own children. What a disgrace.”

There’s a rally of voucher families planned for this week and there will be congressional hearings on reauthorizing the program next week.  Stay tuned.


I’m My Own Grandpa — Lost Version

May 4, 2009

It didn’t dawn on me until Patrick’s comment on Greg’s last Lost post, but I’ll bet that little Charlie, Penny and Desmond’s child, is in fact Charles Widmore.  Little Charlie will be whisked to the past on the Island where he can then grow up to be the Charles Widmore we know.  He is, as the song says, his own grandpa.

The reason why Ellie and Charles are so determined not to change the course of events is not that it is impossible, but because it allows Charles to exist.  So Ellie goes around convincing people, including Desmond and Daniel, that time cannot be changed because she doesn’t want time changed.

I’d further guess that the coming war will be between those who are trying to change the course of time and those who believe that it can’t or shouldn’t be changed.  Jack will lead the change faction and John will lead the destiny faction.  That’s why Charles Widmore needed back on the island to ensure that the right side is going to win.

Update — And I’ll bet that Charlie has already been kidnapped by Charles and Ellie.  The nurse oddly told Penny to leave her child while visiting Desmond.  You wouldn’t bother having that bit of dialogue unless it mattered.

(edited to add link, correct typo, and add update)


Union Busting — Good for the NYT, Bad for Everyone Else

May 4, 2009

The NYT has threatened to shutter its Boston Globe subsidiary in 60 days if its unions don’t agree to various cuts.  According to the Times’ own coverage:

“The company has said since early April that unless the unions make wide-ranging concessions, it will close The Globe…”

Hmmm….  What would the New York Times say if someone else, like let’s say Walmart, threatened to close down its units because unions would drive costs too high.  Oh, wait, they did write an editorial about that on August 16, 2008.  It begins:

“It is hardly news that Wal-Mart will do whatever it takes to keep unions out of its stores, from closing down a unionized outlet to firing pro-union workers.”

I guess it is hardly news that the New York Times would engage in the same practices that they find deplorable if allegedly done by others.

And who could forget this gem of an editorial by the Times on December 28, 2008?  Just a few months ago the Times seemed to think that expanding union power was great because it would raise wages, which was necessary for economic recovery:

“Even modest increases in the share of the unionized labor force push wages upward, because nonunion workplaces must keep up with unionized ones that collectively bargain for increases. By giving employees a bigger say in compensation issues, unions also help to establish corporate norms, the absence of which has contributed to unjustifiable disparities between executive pay and rank-and-file pay.

The argument against unions — that they unduly burden employers with unreasonable demands — is one that corporate America makes in good times and bad, so the recession by itself is not an excuse to avoid pushing the bill next year. The real issue is whether enhanced unionizing would worsen the recession, and there is no evidence that it would.

There is a strong argument that the slack labor market of a recession actually makes unions all the more important. Without a united front, workers will have even less bargaining power in the recession than they had during the growth years of this decade, when they largely failed to get raises even as productivity and profits soared. If pay continues to lag, it will only prolong the downturn by inhibiting spending.”

  Come on NYT!  Can’t you follow your own advice?  Do your part for the economy and raise those Boston Globe wages higher rather than slashing them.

(edited for typos)


Merit Pay Smackdown

May 1, 2009

My colleague, Gary Ritter, and NEA boss, Dennis Van Roekel debated merit pay on the PBS NOW web site.

At the bottom you can vote for who you think won the debate.  Gary currently has 67% of the vote.  Bam!


More Letters to Arne

May 1, 2009

This one is from the ranking minority member of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Rep. Darrell Issa.  Rep. Issa wants to know who at the U.S. Department of Education knew what and when did they know it concerning the D.C. voucher evaluation released weeks after a crucial vote to kill the program.

Here is the press release from Issa’s office in full:

“Delay Release of Report Detailing Successes of DC Voucher Program?

WASHINGTON. D.C.– House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Ranking Member Darrell Issa (R-CA) sent a letter today to Education Secretary Arne Duncan questioning the timing of a study evaluating the District of Columbia Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP) which revealed that participants in the program outperformed those not in the program with regard to reading tests and other key measurements.

 “Prior to the release of the OSP evaluation, the Omnibus Spending Bill was passed by Congress and signed by the President on March 11, 2009.  The bill contained a thinly disguised “poison pill” which had the effect of terminating the OSP, threatening to force those students with these scholarships back into dangerous, academically-underperforming schools, and preventing others from being offered such scholarships in the future,” Issa wrote.  “I am puzzled by the timing of the release of the positive OSP evaluation; just three weeks after Congress de facto killed the program on March 11.  It is highly possible that Congress might not have terminated the OSP if my colleagues, not to mention the White House, had known that this positive evaluation was about to be issued.”

 Issa notes that Oversight Committee Republicans have received credible information that DOE officials were aware of the positive report but kept quiet until after Congress had acted to kill the program.  The letter asks Sec. Duncan to provide a response to key questions by May 13thbefore the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs is scheduled to hold a hearing on the OSP.

 Specifically, Issa asks the Secretary to provide the following: 

  1. A timeline concerning the completion of the IES report, including the dates and names of those individuals in the Department who were given drafts of the report or provided with the data contained in the report.  
  2. All records of communications within the Department, with the White House, Congress, or the District of Columbia officials referring or relating to the public release of the IES report. 
  3. All records of communications between the Department and any non-governmental entity or individual referring or relating to the public release of the IES report.

 The full text of letter is available here.


Systemic Effects of Vouchers — Updated 4/27/09

April 27, 2009

(This is an update of a post I wrote on August 25, 2008.  It now includes the new Milwaukee study.)

In an earlier post I listed all analyses of the effects of U.S. vouchers on program participants using random-assignment experiments.  Those studies tell us about what happens to the academic achievement of students who receive vouchers.  But we all recognize that expanding choice and competition with vouchers may also have significant effects on students who remain in traditional public schools.  Here is a brief summary of the research on that question.

In general, the evidence on systemic effects (how expanding choice and competition affects the performance of traditional public schools) has more methodological limitations than participant effects studies.  We haven’t been able to randomly assign school districts to increased competition, so we have more serious problems with drawing causal inferences.  Even devising accurate measures of the extent of competition has been problematic.  That being said, the findings on systemic effects, like on participant effects, is generally positive and almost never negative.

Even in the absence of choice programs traditional public schools are exposed to some amount of competition.  They may compete with public schools in other districts or with nearby private schools.  A relatively large number of studies have examined this naturally occurring variation in competition.  To avoid being accused of cherry-picking this evidence I’ll rely on the review of that literature conducted by Henry Levin and Clive Belfield.  Here is the abstract of their review, in full:

“This article systematically reviews U.S. evidence from cross-sectional research on educational outcomes when schools must compete with each other. Competition typically is measured by using either the HerfindahlIndex or the enrollment rate at an alternative school choice. Outcomes are academic test scores, graduation/attainment, expenditures/efficiency, teacher quality, students’ post-school wages, and local housing prices. The sampling strategy identified more than 41 relevant empiricalstudies. A sizable majority report beneficial effects of competition, and many report statistically significant correlations. For each study, the effect size of an increase of competition by one standard deviation is reported. The positive gains from competition are modest in scope with respect to realistic changes in levels of competition. The review also notes several methodological challenges and recommends caution in reasoning from point estimates to public policy.”

There have also been a number of studies that have examined the effect of expanding competition or the threat of competition on public schools from voucher programs in Milwaukee and Florida.  Here are all of the major studies of systemic effects of which I am aware from voucher programs in the US:

Milwaukee

Martin Carnoy, et al “Vouchers and Public School Performance,” Economic Policy Institute, October 2007;

Rajashri Chakrabarti, “Can Increasing Private School Participation and Monetary Loss in a Voucher Program Affect Public School Performance? Evidence from Milwaukee,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2007; (forthcoming in the Journal of Public Economics)

Caroline Minter Hoxby, “The Rising Tide,” Education Next, Winter 2001;

Jay P. Greene and Ryan H. Marsh, “The Effect of Milwaukee’s Parental Choice Program on Student Achievement in Milwaukee Public Schools,” School Choice Demonstration Project Report, March 2009.

Florida

Rajashri Chakrabarti “Vouchers, Public School Response and the Role of Incentives: Evidence from Florida  Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report, Number 306, October 2007;

Jay P. Greene and Marcus A. Winters, “Competition Passes the Test,” Education Next, Summer 2004;

Cecilia Elena Rouse, Jane Hannaway, Dan Goldhaber, and David Figlio, “Feeling the Heat: How Low Performing Schools Respond to Voucher and Accountability Pressure,” CALDER Working Paper 13, Urban Institute, November 2007;  

Martin West and Paul Peterson, “The Efficacy of Choice Threats Within School Accountability Systems,” Harvard PEPG Working Paper 05-01, March 23, 2005; (subsequently published in The Economic Journal, March, 2006)

Jay P. Greene and Marcus A. Winters, “The Effect of Special Education Vouchers on Public School Achievement: Evidence From Florida’s McKay Scholarship Program”  Manhattan Institute, Civic Report Number 52, April 2008. (looks only at voucher program for disabled students)

Every one of these 9 studies finds positive systemic effects.  It is importantto note that Rouse, et al are ambiguous as to whether they attribute the improvements observed to competition or to the stigma of Florida’s accountability system.  The other three Florida studies perform analyses that support the conclusion that the gains were from competitive pressure rather than simply from stigma. 

Also Carnoy, et al confirm Chakrabarti’s finding that Milwaukee public schools improved as the voucher program expanded, but they emphasize that those gains did not continue to increase as the program expanded further (nor did those gains disappear).  They find this lack of continued improvement worrisome and believe that it undermines confidence one could have in the initial positive reaction from competition that they and others have observed.  This and other analyses using different measures of competition with null results lead them to conclude that overall there is a null effect  — even though they do confirm Chakrabarti’s finding of a positive effect.

I would also add that Greg Forster and I have a study of systemic effects in Milwaukee and Greg has a new study of systemic effects from the voucher program in Ohio.  And Greg also has a neat study that shows that schools previously threatened with voucher competition slipped after Florida’s Supreme Court struck down the voucher provision.  All of these studies also show positive systemic effects, but since they have not undergone external review and since I do not want to overstate the evidence, I’ve left them out of the above list of studies.  People who, after reading them, have confidence in these three studies should add them to the list of studies on systemic effects.

The bottom line is that none of the studies of systemic effects from voucher programs finds negative effects on student achievement in public schools from voucher competition.  The bulk of the evidence, both from studies of voucher programs and from variation in existing competition among public schools, supports the conclusion that expanding competition improves student achievement.

(edited to add study by Greg on post-voucher FL and Jay’s study on McKay vouchers for disabled students)

(Updated 4/27/09 to include the new Milwaukee study)


Voucher Effects on Participants — Updated 7/05/09

April 27, 2009

(This is an update of a post I originally wrote on August 21.  I’ve included the new DC voucher findings.)

Here is what I believe is a complete (no cherry-picking) list of analyses taking advantage of random-assignment experiments of the effect of vouchers on participants.  As I’ve previously written, 9 of the 10 analyses show significant, positive effects for at least some subgroups of students.

All of them have been published in peer reviewed journals or were subject to outside peer review by the federal government.

Four of the 10 studies are independent replications of earlier analyses.  Cowen replicates Greene, 2001.  Rouse replicates Greene, Peterson, and Du.  Barnard, et al replicate Peterson and Howell.  And Krueger and Zhu also replicate Peterson and Howell.  All of these independent replications (except for Krueger and Zhu) confirm the basic findings of the original analyses by also finding positive effects.

Anyone interested in a more complete discussion of these 10 analyses and why it is important to focus on the random-assignment studies, should read Patrick Wolf’s article in the BYU Law Review that has been reproduced here.

I’m eager to hear how Leo Casey and Eduwonkette, who’ve accused me of cherry-picking the evidence, respond.

  • These 6 studies conclude that all groups of student participants experienced reading or math achievement gains and/or increased likelihood of graduating from high school as a result of vouchers:

Cowen, Joshua M.  2008. “School Choice as a Latent Variable: Estimating the ‘Complier Average Causal Effect’ of Vouchers in Charlotte.” Policy Studies Journal 36 (2).

Greene, Jay P. 2001. “Vouchers in Charlotte,” Education Matters 1 (2):55-60.

Greene, Jay P., Paul E. Peterson, and Jiangtao Du. 1999. “Effectiveness of School Choice: The Milwaukee Experiment.” Education and Urban Society, 31, January, pp. 190-213.

Howell, William G., Patrick J. Wolf, David E. Campbell, and Paul E. Peterson. 2002. “School Vouchers and Academic Performance:  Results from Three Randomized Field Trials.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 21, April, pp. 191-217. (Washington, DC: Gains for all participants, almost all were African Americans)

Rouse, Cecilia E. 1998. “Private School Vouchers and Student Achievement: An Evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(2): 553-602.

Wolf, Patrick, Babette Gutmann, Michael Puma, Brian Kisida, Lou Rizzo, Nada Eissa, and Marsha Silverberg. March 2009.  Evaluation of the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program: Impacts After Three Years. U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. (In the fourth year report the sample size shrunk so that the positive achievement effect barely missed meeting a strict threshold for statistical significance — p < .06 just missing the bar of p < .05.  But this new report was able for the first time to measure the effect of vouchers on the likelihood that students would graduate high school.  As it turns out, vouchers significantly boosted high school graduation rates.  As Paul Peterson points out, this suggests that vouchers boosted both achievement and graduation rates in the 4th year.  Read the 4th year evaluation here.)

  • These 3 studies conclude that at least one important sub-group of student participants experienced achievement gains from the voucher and no subgroup of students was harmed:

Barnard, John, Constantine E. Frangakis, Jennifer L. Hill, and Donald B. Rubin. 2003. “Principal Stratification Approach to Broken Randomized Experiments: A Case Study of School Choice Vouchers in New York City,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 98 (462):299–323. (Gains for African Americans)

Howell, William G., Patrick J. Wolf, David E. Campbell, and Paul E. Peterson. 2002. “School Vouchers and Academic Performance:  Results from Three Randomized Field Trials.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 21, April, pp. 191-217. (Dayton, Ohio: Gains for African Americans)

Peterson, Paul E., and William G. Howell. 2004. “Efficiency, Bias, and Classification Schemes: A Response to Alan B. Krueger and Pei Zhu.” American Behavioral Scientist, 47(5): 699-717.  (New York City: Gains for African Americans)

This 1 study concludes that no sub-group of student participants experienced achievement gains from the voucher:

Krueger, Alan B., and Pei Zhu. 2004. “Another Look at the New York City School Voucher Experiment,” The American Behavioral Scientist 47 (5):658–698.

(Update: For a review of systemic effect research — how expanded competition affects achievement in traditional public schools — see here.)


Democratic Control of Schools

April 26, 2009

Yesterday the New York Times profiled a school district in which the democratically elected school board is dominated by a group that places its financial interests ahead of the educational interests of children in the district.  And that group easily wins school board elections because they are well-organized, have cohesive interests, and turn-out to vote in much higher numbers than parents of children in the schools.

No, the NYT hasn’t suddenly decided to publicize the money-grabbing, electoral bullying of teacher unions in large numbers of school districts all around the country.  Instead the NYT is concerned about the money-grabbing, electoral bullying of a community of Orthodox Jews in Rockland County, NY.

Well, the NYT didn’t exactly describe the Orthodox Jews as money-grabbing: “Many of the Orthodox here and elsewhere feel crushed by the weight of high school taxes and private school tuition.”

The problem, as the NYT piece suggests, is the sense that schools ought be controlled by the families that send their children to those schools: “But increasingly, others are chafing at the idea that people who don’t send their children to the public schools are making the decisions for those from very different cultures who do.”

I have to say that I am sympathetic to this concern.  There are problems with control over schools being located outside of the families whose children attend those schools.  But, unlike the NYT, I don’t restrict my concern to instances involving Orthodox Jews. 

It concerns me that President Obama, who has never sent his children to public schools, and Arne Duncan, who intentionally avoided placing his children in DC public schools, are making decisions to compel children to return to D.C. public schools. 

It concerns me that teacher unions dominate school board elections all over the country, placing their financial interests ahead of the educational interests of children.  In many urban school districts disproportionate numbers of teacher union members also don’t send their own children to the public schools.

The obvious solution is to increase control over schools by the families that attend them by giving those families vouchers.  Empowered with vouchers, schools will be responsive to the interests of current and prospective students rather than the interests of people whose children do not attend those schools is order to attract and retain the revenue those vouchers bring.

Of course, the general regulatory framework governing schools could still be under democratic control, including non-parents.  But let’s restrict the general public’s involvement in controlling schools  to the broad regulatory issues that affect the public’s interests as opposed to the operational details of individual schools.