Rock Star Pay for Rock Star Teachers!

April 28, 2009

(Guest Post by Matthew Ladner)

The Goldwater Institute released a new study today titled New Millennium Schools: Delivering Six-Figure Teacher Salaries in Return for Outstanding Student Learning Gains. In this report, my coauthors Mark Francis, Greg Stone and I argue that the United States has made a tragic error in emphasizing teacher quantity (through efforts to limit average class size) rather than teacher quality. The growing literature on student learning gains clearly demonstrate that teacher quality trumps the impact of class size variation by a wide margin.

The value added literature has revealed stunning equity issues. We don’t attract enough high ability teachers into the profession, we quickly lose many of those we do to frustration or administration, and we distribute most of the remainder to the leafy suburbs. I don’t have a problem with incentive “combat pay” but let’s face it: it is not enough to simply redistribute the limited number of high quality teachers. We need to attract many more of them.

After exploring foreign and domestic examples of systems that make the opposite choice, we propose a solution: a school model which not only employs value added assessment to identify high achieving teachers, but also splits the additional revenue for students after the 20th with the teacher. We propose a 2/3 teacher, 1/3 school split for the 21st student and beyond. This works out to a $5,200 bonus per child.

With this split, our school delivers a six figure teacher salary at 32 students based upon Arizona’s relatively modest funding for charter schools. A class size of 32 students is hardly outside of the historical practice for American public schools, or even the current practice entirely.

There are many practical issues to consider, and variations on the basic model, so please read the study. I’ll write more about the study in the coming days, but the most important point is this: there is plenty of money in the public school system to treat teachers like true professionals and reward them for excellence.

UPDATE: Education Week’s Stephen Sawchuck points out that principals already covertly increase class sizes for additional pay.


WaPo: Why deny D.C. children what special-needs students get?

April 28, 2009

(Guest Post by Matthew Ladner)

The Washington Post editorial page weighs in again on choice, this time in the context of the Forest Grove vs. T.A. case pending before the United States Supreme Court.

The WaPo raises an interesting question: if special needs students have a right to a private school remedy in cases where the public schools have failed to provide an appropriate education, why shouldn’t other children poorly served by public schools enjoy the same right? Kids like those attending DC public schools. A strong case can be made that public schools have horrendous track record in educating both inner city children and children with disabilities.

Of course you wouldn’t want to clog the courts with lawsuits like the special needs law created.  A voucher program with a voucher amount less than the total spending per pupil would be far more equitable and efficient.


Systemic Effects of Vouchers — Updated 4/27/09

April 27, 2009

(This is an update of a post I wrote on August 25, 2008.  It now includes the new Milwaukee study.)

In an earlier post I listed all analyses of the effects of U.S. vouchers on program participants using random-assignment experiments.  Those studies tell us about what happens to the academic achievement of students who receive vouchers.  But we all recognize that expanding choice and competition with vouchers may also have significant effects on students who remain in traditional public schools.  Here is a brief summary of the research on that question.

In general, the evidence on systemic effects (how expanding choice and competition affects the performance of traditional public schools) has more methodological limitations than participant effects studies.  We haven’t been able to randomly assign school districts to increased competition, so we have more serious problems with drawing causal inferences.  Even devising accurate measures of the extent of competition has been problematic.  That being said, the findings on systemic effects, like on participant effects, is generally positive and almost never negative.

Even in the absence of choice programs traditional public schools are exposed to some amount of competition.  They may compete with public schools in other districts or with nearby private schools.  A relatively large number of studies have examined this naturally occurring variation in competition.  To avoid being accused of cherry-picking this evidence I’ll rely on the review of that literature conducted by Henry Levin and Clive Belfield.  Here is the abstract of their review, in full:

“This article systematically reviews U.S. evidence from cross-sectional research on educational outcomes when schools must compete with each other. Competition typically is measured by using either the HerfindahlIndex or the enrollment rate at an alternative school choice. Outcomes are academic test scores, graduation/attainment, expenditures/efficiency, teacher quality, students’ post-school wages, and local housing prices. The sampling strategy identified more than 41 relevant empiricalstudies. A sizable majority report beneficial effects of competition, and many report statistically significant correlations. For each study, the effect size of an increase of competition by one standard deviation is reported. The positive gains from competition are modest in scope with respect to realistic changes in levels of competition. The review also notes several methodological challenges and recommends caution in reasoning from point estimates to public policy.”

There have also been a number of studies that have examined the effect of expanding competition or the threat of competition on public schools from voucher programs in Milwaukee and Florida.  Here are all of the major studies of systemic effects of which I am aware from voucher programs in the US:

Milwaukee

Martin Carnoy, et al “Vouchers and Public School Performance,” Economic Policy Institute, October 2007;

Rajashri Chakrabarti, “Can Increasing Private School Participation and Monetary Loss in a Voucher Program Affect Public School Performance? Evidence from Milwaukee,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2007; (forthcoming in the Journal of Public Economics)

Caroline Minter Hoxby, “The Rising Tide,” Education Next, Winter 2001;

Jay P. Greene and Ryan H. Marsh, “The Effect of Milwaukee’s Parental Choice Program on Student Achievement in Milwaukee Public Schools,” School Choice Demonstration Project Report, March 2009.

Florida

Rajashri Chakrabarti “Vouchers, Public School Response and the Role of Incentives: Evidence from Florida  Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report, Number 306, October 2007;

Jay P. Greene and Marcus A. Winters, “Competition Passes the Test,” Education Next, Summer 2004;

Cecilia Elena Rouse, Jane Hannaway, Dan Goldhaber, and David Figlio, “Feeling the Heat: How Low Performing Schools Respond to Voucher and Accountability Pressure,” CALDER Working Paper 13, Urban Institute, November 2007;  

Martin West and Paul Peterson, “The Efficacy of Choice Threats Within School Accountability Systems,” Harvard PEPG Working Paper 05-01, March 23, 2005; (subsequently published in The Economic Journal, March, 2006)

Jay P. Greene and Marcus A. Winters, “The Effect of Special Education Vouchers on Public School Achievement: Evidence From Florida’s McKay Scholarship Program”  Manhattan Institute, Civic Report Number 52, April 2008. (looks only at voucher program for disabled students)

Every one of these 9 studies finds positive systemic effects.  It is importantto note that Rouse, et al are ambiguous as to whether they attribute the improvements observed to competition or to the stigma of Florida’s accountability system.  The other three Florida studies perform analyses that support the conclusion that the gains were from competitive pressure rather than simply from stigma. 

Also Carnoy, et al confirm Chakrabarti’s finding that Milwaukee public schools improved as the voucher program expanded, but they emphasize that those gains did not continue to increase as the program expanded further (nor did those gains disappear).  They find this lack of continued improvement worrisome and believe that it undermines confidence one could have in the initial positive reaction from competition that they and others have observed.  This and other analyses using different measures of competition with null results lead them to conclude that overall there is a null effect  — even though they do confirm Chakrabarti’s finding of a positive effect.

I would also add that Greg Forster and I have a study of systemic effects in Milwaukee and Greg has a new study of systemic effects from the voucher program in Ohio.  And Greg also has a neat study that shows that schools previously threatened with voucher competition slipped after Florida’s Supreme Court struck down the voucher provision.  All of these studies also show positive systemic effects, but since they have not undergone external review and since I do not want to overstate the evidence, I’ve left them out of the above list of studies.  People who, after reading them, have confidence in these three studies should add them to the list of studies on systemic effects.

The bottom line is that none of the studies of systemic effects from voucher programs finds negative effects on student achievement in public schools from voucher competition.  The bulk of the evidence, both from studies of voucher programs and from variation in existing competition among public schools, supports the conclusion that expanding competition improves student achievement.

(edited to add study by Greg on post-voucher FL and Jay’s study on McKay vouchers for disabled students)

(Updated 4/27/09 to include the new Milwaukee study)


Voucher Effects on Participants — Updated 7/05/09

April 27, 2009

(This is an update of a post I originally wrote on August 21.  I’ve included the new DC voucher findings.)

Here is what I believe is a complete (no cherry-picking) list of analyses taking advantage of random-assignment experiments of the effect of vouchers on participants.  As I’ve previously written, 9 of the 10 analyses show significant, positive effects for at least some subgroups of students.

All of them have been published in peer reviewed journals or were subject to outside peer review by the federal government.

Four of the 10 studies are independent replications of earlier analyses.  Cowen replicates Greene, 2001.  Rouse replicates Greene, Peterson, and Du.  Barnard, et al replicate Peterson and Howell.  And Krueger and Zhu also replicate Peterson and Howell.  All of these independent replications (except for Krueger and Zhu) confirm the basic findings of the original analyses by also finding positive effects.

Anyone interested in a more complete discussion of these 10 analyses and why it is important to focus on the random-assignment studies, should read Patrick Wolf’s article in the BYU Law Review that has been reproduced here.

I’m eager to hear how Leo Casey and Eduwonkette, who’ve accused me of cherry-picking the evidence, respond.

  • These 6 studies conclude that all groups of student participants experienced reading or math achievement gains and/or increased likelihood of graduating from high school as a result of vouchers:

Cowen, Joshua M.  2008. “School Choice as a Latent Variable: Estimating the ‘Complier Average Causal Effect’ of Vouchers in Charlotte.” Policy Studies Journal 36 (2).

Greene, Jay P. 2001. “Vouchers in Charlotte,” Education Matters 1 (2):55-60.

Greene, Jay P., Paul E. Peterson, and Jiangtao Du. 1999. “Effectiveness of School Choice: The Milwaukee Experiment.” Education and Urban Society, 31, January, pp. 190-213.

Howell, William G., Patrick J. Wolf, David E. Campbell, and Paul E. Peterson. 2002. “School Vouchers and Academic Performance:  Results from Three Randomized Field Trials.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 21, April, pp. 191-217. (Washington, DC: Gains for all participants, almost all were African Americans)

Rouse, Cecilia E. 1998. “Private School Vouchers and Student Achievement: An Evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(2): 553-602.

Wolf, Patrick, Babette Gutmann, Michael Puma, Brian Kisida, Lou Rizzo, Nada Eissa, and Marsha Silverberg. March 2009.  Evaluation of the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program: Impacts After Three Years. U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. (In the fourth year report the sample size shrunk so that the positive achievement effect barely missed meeting a strict threshold for statistical significance — p < .06 just missing the bar of p < .05.  But this new report was able for the first time to measure the effect of vouchers on the likelihood that students would graduate high school.  As it turns out, vouchers significantly boosted high school graduation rates.  As Paul Peterson points out, this suggests that vouchers boosted both achievement and graduation rates in the 4th year.  Read the 4th year evaluation here.)

  • These 3 studies conclude that at least one important sub-group of student participants experienced achievement gains from the voucher and no subgroup of students was harmed:

Barnard, John, Constantine E. Frangakis, Jennifer L. Hill, and Donald B. Rubin. 2003. “Principal Stratification Approach to Broken Randomized Experiments: A Case Study of School Choice Vouchers in New York City,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 98 (462):299–323. (Gains for African Americans)

Howell, William G., Patrick J. Wolf, David E. Campbell, and Paul E. Peterson. 2002. “School Vouchers and Academic Performance:  Results from Three Randomized Field Trials.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 21, April, pp. 191-217. (Dayton, Ohio: Gains for African Americans)

Peterson, Paul E., and William G. Howell. 2004. “Efficiency, Bias, and Classification Schemes: A Response to Alan B. Krueger and Pei Zhu.” American Behavioral Scientist, 47(5): 699-717.  (New York City: Gains for African Americans)

This 1 study concludes that no sub-group of student participants experienced achievement gains from the voucher:

Krueger, Alan B., and Pei Zhu. 2004. “Another Look at the New York City School Voucher Experiment,” The American Behavioral Scientist 47 (5):658–698.

(Update: For a review of systemic effect research — how expanded competition affects achievement in traditional public schools — see here.)


Michael Oher Drafted by the Ravens

April 26, 2009

(Guest Post by Matthew Ladner)

Michael Lewis is busy typing a new afterword for The Blind Side as we speak, as Michael Oher was selected with the 21st pick in the NFL draft by the Baltimore Ravens. Congrats to Michael and his heroic family.

One of the earliest posts I wrote here on JPGB was about Michael. As we celebrate Oher’s incredible good fortune at overcoming incredible odds to get where he is today, I cannot help but to recall Lewis’ chilling words from the book:

Michael Oher was in possession of what had to be among the more conspicuous athletic gifts…and yet, without outside intervention even his talent would likely have been thrown away…If Michael Oher’s talent could be missed, whose couldn’t? Those poor black kids [in the inner-city] were like left tackles: people whose values were hidden in plain sight…Pity the kid inside Hurt Village [in Memphis] who was born to play the piano, or manage people, or trade bonds.

Think of this quote the next time someone urges you to be “patient” when it comes to education reform.  A mind is indeed a terrible thing to waste, or to never develop.


Democratic Control of Schools

April 26, 2009

Yesterday the New York Times profiled a school district in which the democratically elected school board is dominated by a group that places its financial interests ahead of the educational interests of children in the district.  And that group easily wins school board elections because they are well-organized, have cohesive interests, and turn-out to vote in much higher numbers than parents of children in the schools.

No, the NYT hasn’t suddenly decided to publicize the money-grabbing, electoral bullying of teacher unions in large numbers of school districts all around the country.  Instead the NYT is concerned about the money-grabbing, electoral bullying of a community of Orthodox Jews in Rockland County, NY.

Well, the NYT didn’t exactly describe the Orthodox Jews as money-grabbing: “Many of the Orthodox here and elsewhere feel crushed by the weight of high school taxes and private school tuition.”

The problem, as the NYT piece suggests, is the sense that schools ought be controlled by the families that send their children to those schools: “But increasingly, others are chafing at the idea that people who don’t send their children to the public schools are making the decisions for those from very different cultures who do.”

I have to say that I am sympathetic to this concern.  There are problems with control over schools being located outside of the families whose children attend those schools.  But, unlike the NYT, I don’t restrict my concern to instances involving Orthodox Jews. 

It concerns me that President Obama, who has never sent his children to public schools, and Arne Duncan, who intentionally avoided placing his children in DC public schools, are making decisions to compel children to return to D.C. public schools. 

It concerns me that teacher unions dominate school board elections all over the country, placing their financial interests ahead of the educational interests of children.  In many urban school districts disproportionate numbers of teacher union members also don’t send their own children to the public schools.

The obvious solution is to increase control over schools by the families that attend them by giving those families vouchers.  Empowered with vouchers, schools will be responsive to the interests of current and prospective students rather than the interests of people whose children do not attend those schools is order to attract and retain the revenue those vouchers bring.

Of course, the general regulatory framework governing schools could still be under democratic control, including non-parents.  But let’s restrict the general public’s involvement in controlling schools  to the broad regulatory issues that affect the public’s interests as opposed to the operational details of individual schools.


Another Quiet Friday

April 25, 2009

What gives?  A second Friday has passed without another sneaky political trick to rob low-income minority students of educational opportunities while attempting to attract as little media attention as possible.  It’s almost like Obama and Duncan have stopped trying — like they are just phoning it in.

Or are they deterred by all of the media attention they did get?


How much do Arizona Public Schools Actually Spend?

April 24, 2009

(Guest Post by Matthew Ladner)

Watch your favorite bearded libertarian edu-nerd (okay maybe third favorite) debate how much Arizona really spends in public schools:


Famous Steakholders — The Grand Finale

April 23, 2009

You know how fireworks shows end with a massive display to sparkle the eye?  Well, this grand finale of the  Famous Steakholder series similarly contains an explosion of steakholder images.  Imagine the 1812 Overture playing in the background while you peruse these. Enjoy!

onecow

stakeholder

steakholder

steaks-250-01

donaldtrumpsteaks

btwwoodcowboy


Questions for Leo-The Final Chapter

April 23, 2009

(Guest Post by Matthew Ladner)

In my final question for Leo, I ask: Leo, do your puppets have Taco Flavored Kisses?