Flypaper Fail

April 13, 2010

(Guest post by Greg Forster)

Mike Petrilli argues that tenure reform is better than choice.

Trouble is, he openly admits that the only reason DC got tenure reform is because of the proliferation of charter schools: “Score one for competitive effects!” says Mike.

He also cites tenure reform in Florida and Rhode Island. Both of which have – guess what? – school choice programs.

Mike asks, why bother with choice? Why not go directly for tenure reform?

Uh, maybe because the only possible way to create sufficient pressure for something as “radioactive” (Mike’s word) as tenure reform is the “competitive effects” created by choice? As your own examples show?

Sorry, Mike, your argument has failed.


Incentives and Motivation

December 9, 2009

Surely we can find a happy medium?

(Guest post by Greg Forster)

I’ve just read a fascinating article – Frederick Herzberg’s “One More Time: How Do You Motivate Employees?” from the Harvard Business Review. The 1987 version, an update of the original 1968 article of the same title, went on to become HBR’s most requested reprint ever.

I can see why. Partly it’s the humor value, which  is considerable. “What is the simplest, surest, and most direct way of getting someone to do something?” Herzberg’s first answer: the KITA. (Hint: KIT stands for “Kick In The.” Herzberg claims original authorship of this acronym, and given that the article first appeared in 1968 I believe him.) The KITA comes in many forms, including what Herzberg dubs the “negative physical KITA,” i.e. the literal kick. But there are numerous problems with using the negative physical KITA to motivate employees, not least that “it directly stimulates the autonomic system, and this often results in negative feedback.” Translation: the subject may kick back.

 

Negative autonomic feedback

But Herzberg also makes a substantial contribution to organizational theory, one that’s forced me to do some new thinking on the regular debates we have on the role of incentives in education.

After a brief discussion of the negative physical KITA, Herzberg moves on to what he dubs the “negative psychological KITA,” i.e. making people feel bad unless they do something. The advantages of the negative psychological KITA over the negative physical KITA are considerable, including: “since the number of psychological pains that a person can feel is almost infinite, the direction and site possibilities of the KITA are increased many times”; “the person administering the kick can manage to be above it all and let the system accomplish the dirty work”; and “finally, if the employee does complain, he or she can always be accused of being paranoid; there is no tangible evidence of an actual attack.”

But it is pretty clear to most people that both types of negative KITA do not really produce what we usually call “motivation.” What they produce is movement. The subject moves, but does not become motivated. Hence – and this is the important part – the method is of limited effectiveness. As long as you keep applying KITAs the subject will keep moving, but only as long as you keep kicking and only as far as you kick. To be really effective, you need to do something to get the subject to keep moving – produce ongoing motivation.

Hence most organizations, sensibly enough, turn to positive incentives and discourage managers from using negative ones. And here things get really interesting. Herzberg argues that most of the positive incentives normally used in an attempt to produce motivation are really very similar in their outcomes to negative KITAs – producing movement rather than motivation. The subject subjectively experiences them as positive rather than negative, but objectively the result in terms of work output is similar. You’re just pulling rather than pushing. The subject only moves as long and as far as you pull. Herzberg thus gives these incentives the somewhat paradoxical label “positive KITAs.”

A positive KITA?

Herzberg’s examples of positive KITAs include pay and benefit increases, reduction in work hours, and improved workplace relations (i.e. communications and “sensitivity” training for managers, morale surveys and “worker suggestion” plans).

The positive KITA, Herzberg argues, despite being ubiquitous in the business world, is actually not much more effective than the negative – and it’s a lot more expensive. This is especially true since positive KITAs (unlike negative ones) must be progressive. If you give the worker a $500 bonus this year, when last year you gave him a $1,000 bonus, this objectively positive action will actually be subjectively experienced as negative.

Herzberg argues that a real, self-sustaining motivation can be produced in employees by something he calls “job enrichment.” That sounds like something the warm and fuzzy folks would advocate, but Herzberg actually spends a good deal of time taking the warm and fuzzy folks to task for their inanity. (This provides much of the humor value. It’s also historically interesting – it’s amazing to see how far the warm and fuzzy disease had already spread by 1968.) What Herzberg is arguing for is something more serious than the label implies.

His underlying psycological and organizational theory is a bit too much to recopy it all here, but here’s a capsule summary. He and others did a large number of empirical studies and found that job satisfaction and job dissatisfaction didn’t usually come from the same sources. For example, having a jerk for a boss produces job dissatisfaction, but having a nice boss usually does not produce any job satisfaction. Niceness in bosses simply prevents workers from feeling dissatisfied; it doesn’t actually make the job satisfying.

The key insight to get here is that removing dissatisfaction doesn’t produce any satisfaction, and highly effective motivation comes from producing satisfaction rather than from removing dissatisfaction.

His meta-analysis of the empirical research finds that pay and benefits, job security, company policy, working conditions and on-the-job relationships are all normally associated with levels of dissatisfaction, but rarely with levels of satisfaction. On the other hand, levels of satisfaction are associated with achievement, recognition for achievement, responsibility, advancement, aspects of the work itself, and development of one’s capacities to do the work.

Herzberg’s idea of “job enrichment” is to increase worker’s experiences of the things that provide high levels of satisfaction. Give workers more responsibility and more opportunity to achieve, and then recognize success – most importantly with advancement that brings still more responsibility and opportunity for achievement. The converse of this is that failure must also be “recognized” – primarily through withholding advancement and responsibility rather than through negative KITAs.

I find his theory and evidence persuasive. And it has helped me see a little more clearly the underlying logic behind some objections to education policies like merit pay.

Yet I don’t think this analysis actually does take anything away from the case for merit pay, still less from the case for other education reforms like school choice. If anything, it makes them stronger. And taking account of this analysis will help us make the case more effectively.

Some of the objections to merit pay are based on an essentially Herzbergian conception of worker motivation. Smart people don’t deny that money plays some role in motivating people to do more work. But even among those who don’t advocate touchy-feely romantic delusions about teachers who are angelic beings with no connection to the material world, there is a lot of skepticism that you can get them to work all that much harder just for “a few extra sheckels” (as one of the more sensible critics once put it in a comment here on this blog).

Yet consider what would have to happen for Herzbergian “job enrichment” to occur in the teaching profession. First of all, you’d need an objective measurement of achievement. Then you’d need to give teachers autonomy in the classroom and hold them accountable for results on that metric. And for the accountability to take the form of advancement and increased autonomy (and accountability), you’d need to remove the one-size-fits-all union scale and work rules that dominate the profession.

In other words, it’s not so much the pay that makes merit pay worth trying, as it is the fact that merit pay creates tangible recognition for success. The current system seems almost deliberately crafted to deny teachers as many opportunities for satisfaction as possible. Merit pay is an attempt to create more such opportunities.

It’s worth noting that Michelle Rhee’s proposed two-track system in DC labels the old, union-dominated track the “red” track and the new, merit-based track the “green” track. Rhee understands that what she’s offering isn’t just, or even primarily, more money. She’s offering DC teachers their professional pride.

But school choice looks even better by this light. Test scores would be a limited basis for creating opportunities for Herzbergian satisfaction. On the other hand, if your objective measurement of job performance is parental feedback, the sky’s the limit. In this context it’s worth noting that Herzberg says the only meaningful measure of job performance is ultimately the client or customer’s satisfaction; using any other measure is taking your eye off the ball.

You could even combine the two to create a truly graduated scale of autonomy and accountability. New teachers could be required to use a standard curriculum and be evaluated on how their students – all types of students, not just the rich white ones – progress in basic skills. (That, of course, is the real primary function of test-based accountability – ensuring that kids who face more challenges aren’t just warehoused for twelve years while the rich white kids get an education.) Teachers who prove they can deliver the goods on reading and math for students of all backgrounds could then be given more classroom autonomy and evaluated based on parental feedback rather than test scores. Freedom from test-based accountability is the payoff for proving you can teach basic skills reliably. Schools could set up any number of intermediate arrangements in between “pure” test scores and “pure” parental feedback, with teachers earning more and more recognition and autonomy as they prove more and more their ability to teach effectively.

Looking back at my previous posts on teacher autonomy and satisfaction levels in public v. private schools, the poisonous influence of one-size-fits-all pay scales, and the union-driven destruction of the teaching profession, I can see this is really the framework I’ve been trying to articulate all along. The unions keep bleating about how teachers should be treated like professionals. I agree. They should have autonomy, like professionals – and they should be held accountable for results.


Everyone Wins in the Wall Street Journal

November 4, 2009

Everybody Wins

(Guest post by Greg Forster)

Today’s Journal has a hard-hitting editorial on Marcus’s new study showing that competition from charters improves regular public schools in NYC.

Opponents of school choice are running out of excuses as evidence continues to roll in about the positive impact of charter schools…State and local policy makers who cave to union demands and block the growth of charters aren’t doing traditional public school students any favors.

And where did you read about it first? Oh yeah.


Marcus Wins! Big Deal, So Does Everybody.

October 28, 2009

Everybody Wins

NOT the cover of Marcus’s new study

(Guest post by Greg Forster)

Well, I made no secret of who I thought was the winner in the Marcus/Murray deathmatch over college education.

But it turns out it’s no big deal, because Marcus says “Everyone Wins!”

In his new study of that title, I mean. Marcus finds that charter schools are improving regular public schools in NYC by creating healthy competitive incentives. The effect is small, fitting the overall pattern in the research – charters typically don’t give you as big a boost as vouchers, but having them is better than not.

For all you Rawlsians out there in JPGB-land, Marcus also finds that the lowest-performing students in NYC’s regular public schools benefit from charter competition; in fact, while the benefits for the overall population are statistically certain only in reading, they’re certain in both reading and math for low performers.


Universal Voucher Benefits

September 3, 2009

Economist Maria Marta Ferreyra of Carnegie Mellon University has a new article coming out in the American Economic Review that models what would happen in a multi-district urban area if there were universal vouchers.  She finds that universal vouchers would generally improve income and racial integration and improve educational outcomes.

She explains it all in this excellent video:

UPDATED to correct typo


Public Schools Start 12-Step Program

August 17, 2009

The Wall Street Journal has a piece today on how urban school districts around the country have launched marketing programs to lure students back from charters and neighboring districts after having lost large portions of their enrollment. 

This is the first step in their 12-step program — acknowledging that they have a problem and need to do something about it.  For all of you folks out there who doubt that public schools respond to competitive pressure (Rick Hess, Sol Stern, Mike Petrilli, Kevin Carey, etc…), how do you explain this response?

I know, I know they might respond that marketing is not a real response in that it does not involve actually improving school quality.  That’s true, but if the schools are doing things to improve, how would anyone know about it if the schools don’t market their strengths? 

And I would agree that a marketing campaign is not a sufficient response, but it is an important sign that they are noticing the competition and experiencing pain from losing enrollment.  They’ve acknowledge that there is a power higher than them… and it is the customer.


What Is Competition?

June 5, 2009

Monopoly - Pennybags

He’s done such a good job with your schools,
now he’s going to run your health care!

(Guest post by Greg Forster)

Mike Petrilli notes that Barack Obama and Paul Krugman are using the language of “competition” to mask Obama’s ambitions for a government takeover of the health care sector.

Krugman writes:

The “public option,” if it materializes, will be just that – an option Americans can choose. And the reason for providing this option was clearly laid out in Mr. Obama’s letter: It will give Americans “a better range of choices, make the health care market more competitive, and keep the insurance companies honest.

Mike responds:

You mean just like creating charter schools will give Americans “a better range of choices, make the education system more competitive, and keep the teachers unions honest”?

So in education, where the government is the major player, we’re trying to create competition via the private sector. But in health care, where the private sector is still a major player, we’re trying to create competition via the public sector?

Weird.

Mike, “weird” is not the word you’re looking for. Try “wrong.”

In health insurance, as in education, there’s no “market” deserving the name. But the way the government eliminates the market is slightly different. In education, government destroys the market by providing the service for “free” (of course you pay for it in your taxes, but it’s free at the point of service), making it impossible for anyone to compete; other providers are stuck serving niche markets. Whereas in health care government uses the tax code to force almost everyone to get insurance through their employers, which also eliminates the market, but more sneakily.

It’s as though government told you that from now on, your employer gets to pick one restaurant for you, and from now on you’re only allowed to eat out at that restaurant. They’d say that it’s a free market – because, hey, the restaurants are privately owned and there are multiple options available!

So it’s not surprising if the health sector and the education sector seem similar. Both are government-controlled command economies. The difference is, in the health sector you have these huge privately owned companies acting as rent-seekers, siphoning off tons of money and getting away with it because government has abolished the market forces that ordinarily weed out leeches – as Matt once explained to our Sith apprentice Leo. Whereas in the education sector, the rent-seeker siphoning off tons of money is the government itself.

The Obama/Krugman proposal isn’t about creating competition for private health insurers. That’s a smokescreen. It’s simply the first step toward making the command economy in the health sector more like the command economy in the education sector.


Free to Teach: What America’s Teachers Say about Teaching in Public and Private Schools

May 20, 2009

Free to Teach cover

(Guest post by Greg Forster)

Today the Friedman Foundation releases Free to Teach: What America’s Teachers Say about Teaching in Public and Private Schools, a study I co-authored with my Friedman colleague Christian D’Andrea.

It’s a simple study with a powerful finding. We used the teacher data from the Schools and Staffing Survey, a very large, nationally representative, confidential survey of school employees conducted by the U.S. Department of Education. We just separated public school teachers from private school teachers and compared their answers on questions covering their working conditions.

We found that the government school system is not providing the best environment for teaching. Public school teachers fare worse than private school teachers on virtually every measurement – sometimes by large margins. They have less autonomy in the classroom, less influence over school policy, less ability to keep order, less support from administrators and peers, and less safety. So it’s not surprising that they also have less job satisfaction on a variety of measures. About the only thing they have more of is burnout. (The measures of teacher burnout were some of the more eye-popping numbers we found in the federal data set.)

Free to Teach box scores

The Schools and Staffing Survey is observational, so we can’t run causal statistical analyses. But it’s really not hard to figure out why private schools provide a better teaching environment. The government school system responds mainly to political imperatives, because anything owned and run by government is inherently political and always will be. Meanwhile, the biggest pressure on private schools is from parents, because if the schools don’t please the parents, the parents can take their children elsewhere.

Which of the two sources of influence – politics or parents – do you think is more focused on demanding that schools provide better teaching?

That’s why private schools deliver a better education even when they serve the same students and families as public schools, and public schools improve when parents can choose their schools.

Parents and teachers are traditionally thought of as antagonists. And no wonder – under the current system, parents have no effective control over their children’s education other than what they can extract from their teachers by pestering and nagging them. The status quo is designed to force parents and teachers into an antagonistic relationship.

But in the big picture, parents are the best friends teachers have. Ultimately, it’s parents who provide the pressure for better teaching, and – if what we’re seeing in the Schools and Staffing Survey is any indication – that pressure for better teaching provides better working conditions for teachers.

Here’s the executive summary:

Many people claim to speak on behalf of America’s teachers, but we rarely get the opportunity to find out what teachers actually have to say about their work – especially when people are debating government control of schooling.

This study presents data from a major national survey of teachers conducted by the U.S. Department of Education; the Schools & Staffing Survey. We break down these observational data for public and private school teachers, in order to compare what teachers have to say about their work in each of the two school sectors.

These are eye-opening data for the teaching profession. They show that public school teachers are currently working in a school system that doesn’t provide the best environment for teaching. Teachers are victims of the dysfunctional government school system right alongside their students. Much of the reason government schools produce mediocre results for their students is because the teachers in those schools are hindered from doing their jobs as well as they could and as well as they want to. By listening to teachers in public and private schools, we discover numerous ways in which their working conditions differ—differences that certainly help explain the gap in educational outcomes between public and private schools. Exposing schools to competition, as is the case in the private school sector, is good for learning partly because it’s good for teaching.

Key findings include:

• Private school teachers are much more likely to say they will continue teaching as long as they are able (62 percent v. 44 percent), while public school teachers are much more likely to say they’ll leave teaching as soon as they are eligible for retirement (33 percent v. 12 percent) and that they would immediately leave teaching if a higher paying job were available (20 percent v. 12 percent).

• Private school teachers are much more likely to have a great deal of control over selection of textbooks and instructional materials (53 percent v. 32 percent) and content, topics, and skills to be taught (60 percent v. 36 percent).

• Private school teachers are much more likely to have a great deal of influence on performance standards for students (40 percent v. 18 percent), curriculum (47 percent v. 22 percent), and discipline policy (25 percent v. 13 percent).

• Public school teachers are much more likely to report that student misbehavior (37 percent v. 21 percent) or tardiness and class cutting (33 percent v. 17 percent) disrupt their classes, and are four times more likely to say student violence is a problem on at least a monthly basis (48 percent v. 12 percent).

• Private school teachers are much more likely to strongly agree that they have all the textbooks and supplies they need (67 percent v. 41 percent).

• Private school teachers are more likely to agree that they get all the support they need to teach special needs students (72 percent v. 64 percent).

• Seven out of ten private school teachers report that student racial tension never happens at their schools, compared to fewer than half of public school teachers (72 percent v. 43 percent).

• Although salaries are higher in public schools, private school teachers are more likely to be satisfied with their salaries (51 percent v. 46 percent).

• Measurements of teacher workload (class sizes, hours worked, and hours teaching) are similar in public and private schools.

• Private school teachers are more likely to teach in urban environments (39 percent v. 29 percent) while public school teachers are more likely to teach in rural environments (22 percent versus 11 percent).

• Public school teachers are twice as likely as private school teachers to agree that the stress and disappointments they experience at their schools are so great that teaching there isn’t really worth it (13 percent v. 6 percent).

• Public school teachers are almost twice as likely to agree that they sometimes feel it is a waste of time to try to do their best as a teacher (17 percent v. 9 percent).

• Nearly one in five public school teachers has been physically threatened by a student, compared to only one in twenty private school teachers (18 percent v. 5 percent). Nearly one in ten public school teachers has been physically attacked by a student, three times the rate in private schools (9 percent v. 3 percent).

• One in eight public school teachers reports that physical conflicts among students occur everyday; only one in 50 private school teachers says the same (12 percent v. 2 percent).


Shocking Discoveries!

May 11, 2009

Shock Warning logo

(Guest post by Greg Forster)

The Detroit Free Press should come with a warning label. In today’s edition I was jolted by the shocking discovery that suburban public schools compete with each other for students. Apparently when parents are able to choose schools, the schools are aware of this and respond by seeking to get their business. All because – are you ready for this? – public schools want to maximize their budgets!

Who knew?

Kudos to the Free Press for uncovering this amazing story!

HT ALELR for the story, dose.ca and Overload for the logo.


Systemic Effects of Vouchers — Updated 4/27/09

April 27, 2009

(This is an update of a post I wrote on August 25, 2008.  It now includes the new Milwaukee study.)

In an earlier post I listed all analyses of the effects of U.S. vouchers on program participants using random-assignment experiments.  Those studies tell us about what happens to the academic achievement of students who receive vouchers.  But we all recognize that expanding choice and competition with vouchers may also have significant effects on students who remain in traditional public schools.  Here is a brief summary of the research on that question.

In general, the evidence on systemic effects (how expanding choice and competition affects the performance of traditional public schools) has more methodological limitations than participant effects studies.  We haven’t been able to randomly assign school districts to increased competition, so we have more serious problems with drawing causal inferences.  Even devising accurate measures of the extent of competition has been problematic.  That being said, the findings on systemic effects, like on participant effects, is generally positive and almost never negative.

Even in the absence of choice programs traditional public schools are exposed to some amount of competition.  They may compete with public schools in other districts or with nearby private schools.  A relatively large number of studies have examined this naturally occurring variation in competition.  To avoid being accused of cherry-picking this evidence I’ll rely on the review of that literature conducted by Henry Levin and Clive Belfield.  Here is the abstract of their review, in full:

“This article systematically reviews U.S. evidence from cross-sectional research on educational outcomes when schools must compete with each other. Competition typically is measured by using either the HerfindahlIndex or the enrollment rate at an alternative school choice. Outcomes are academic test scores, graduation/attainment, expenditures/efficiency, teacher quality, students’ post-school wages, and local housing prices. The sampling strategy identified more than 41 relevant empiricalstudies. A sizable majority report beneficial effects of competition, and many report statistically significant correlations. For each study, the effect size of an increase of competition by one standard deviation is reported. The positive gains from competition are modest in scope with respect to realistic changes in levels of competition. The review also notes several methodological challenges and recommends caution in reasoning from point estimates to public policy.”

There have also been a number of studies that have examined the effect of expanding competition or the threat of competition on public schools from voucher programs in Milwaukee and Florida.  Here are all of the major studies of systemic effects of which I am aware from voucher programs in the US:

Milwaukee

Martin Carnoy, et al “Vouchers and Public School Performance,” Economic Policy Institute, October 2007;

Rajashri Chakrabarti, “Can Increasing Private School Participation and Monetary Loss in a Voucher Program Affect Public School Performance? Evidence from Milwaukee,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2007; (forthcoming in the Journal of Public Economics)

Caroline Minter Hoxby, “The Rising Tide,” Education Next, Winter 2001;

Jay P. Greene and Ryan H. Marsh, “The Effect of Milwaukee’s Parental Choice Program on Student Achievement in Milwaukee Public Schools,” School Choice Demonstration Project Report, March 2009.

Florida

Rajashri Chakrabarti “Vouchers, Public School Response and the Role of Incentives: Evidence from Florida  Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report, Number 306, October 2007;

Jay P. Greene and Marcus A. Winters, “Competition Passes the Test,” Education Next, Summer 2004;

Cecilia Elena Rouse, Jane Hannaway, Dan Goldhaber, and David Figlio, “Feeling the Heat: How Low Performing Schools Respond to Voucher and Accountability Pressure,” CALDER Working Paper 13, Urban Institute, November 2007;  

Martin West and Paul Peterson, “The Efficacy of Choice Threats Within School Accountability Systems,” Harvard PEPG Working Paper 05-01, March 23, 2005; (subsequently published in The Economic Journal, March, 2006)

Jay P. Greene and Marcus A. Winters, “The Effect of Special Education Vouchers on Public School Achievement: Evidence From Florida’s McKay Scholarship Program”  Manhattan Institute, Civic Report Number 52, April 2008. (looks only at voucher program for disabled students)

Every one of these 9 studies finds positive systemic effects.  It is importantto note that Rouse, et al are ambiguous as to whether they attribute the improvements observed to competition or to the stigma of Florida’s accountability system.  The other three Florida studies perform analyses that support the conclusion that the gains were from competitive pressure rather than simply from stigma. 

Also Carnoy, et al confirm Chakrabarti’s finding that Milwaukee public schools improved as the voucher program expanded, but they emphasize that those gains did not continue to increase as the program expanded further (nor did those gains disappear).  They find this lack of continued improvement worrisome and believe that it undermines confidence one could have in the initial positive reaction from competition that they and others have observed.  This and other analyses using different measures of competition with null results lead them to conclude that overall there is a null effect  — even though they do confirm Chakrabarti’s finding of a positive effect.

I would also add that Greg Forster and I have a study of systemic effects in Milwaukee and Greg has a new study of systemic effects from the voucher program in Ohio.  And Greg also has a neat study that shows that schools previously threatened with voucher competition slipped after Florida’s Supreme Court struck down the voucher provision.  All of these studies also show positive systemic effects, but since they have not undergone external review and since I do not want to overstate the evidence, I’ve left them out of the above list of studies.  People who, after reading them, have confidence in these three studies should add them to the list of studies on systemic effects.

The bottom line is that none of the studies of systemic effects from voucher programs finds negative effects on student achievement in public schools from voucher competition.  The bulk of the evidence, both from studies of voucher programs and from variation in existing competition among public schools, supports the conclusion that expanding competition improves student achievement.

(edited to add study by Greg on post-voucher FL and Jay’s study on McKay vouchers for disabled students)

(Updated 4/27/09 to include the new Milwaukee study)