It’s True, She Really Doesn’t Make $83K!

May 28, 2010

(Guest post by Greg Forster)

Don’t miss this solid gold story of Chris Christie v. the dishonesty of activists claiming to represent teachers.

Buildup: Teacher in the audience challenges Christie’s statements about teacher pay, saying if his figures were right she’d be making $83,000, and she doesn’t make nearly that much. Christie replies that she does if you count benefits. She fires back that she has a master’s degree and lots of experience and she isn’t adequately paid for these. Christie remarks that if she doesn’t think she’s paid what she’s worth, she’s free to do something else with her life, and moves on to the next questioner.

Kicker:  Public records show that the teacher in question makes just under $85,000 base salary. Oops.


New Report on Teacher Pensions

April 14, 2010

[Guest post by Stuart Buck]

Yesterday, the Manhattan Institute and the Foundation for Educational Choice released a report written by me and Josh Barro. The title: “Unfunded Teacher Pension Plans: It’s Worse Than You Think.” The main finding:

According to the fifty-nine funds’ own financial statements, total unfunded liabilities to teachers—i.e., the gap between existing plan assets and the present value of benefits accrued by plan participants—are $332 billion. But according to our more conservative calculations, these plans’ unfunded liabilities total about $933 billion.

In addition, we have found that only $116 billion, or less than one quarter, of this $600 billion discrepancy is attributable to the stock market drop precipitated by the 2007 financial crisis. The Dow Jones Industrial Average would have to nearly double overnight to make up for the present underfunding of these plans.

The meat of what we did is this: Most state plans assume that their current investments will get about an 8% rate of return in perpetuity. So that means that they set aside less money now to cover the pensions that will be paid in 2015, 2020, 2025, etc. But the 8% assumption is wrong, we argue, for two reasons: First, recent history shows that it may be too optimistic. Second, investments that have an 8% expected rate of return necessarily carry some risk — risk that the plan will actually fall short in a given year or even decade. And when a plan falls short, the burden falls to the taxpayer to make up the difference.

So we reanalyzed the teacher pension plans using the same interest rate that private plans are allowed to use — about 6%, based on corporate bond rates. When we do that, it turns out that pension plans are way more underfunded than they are publicly admitting.

Over at The Quick and Ed, Chad Aldeman has a response to our study:

States, unlike private companies, do not fold under. Indiana, which according to the authors has a DB pension plan for teachers that is only 42% funded, is not likely to go out of business and take its workers down with it. The state of Indiana can assume a riskier investment return for its pension fund than an employer like those mentioned above or any other modern private firm (and, just for good measure, it’s worth pointing out that Indiana assumes only a 3 percent real rate of return).

All this is lost on the report’s authors, who would prefer states lower their assumptions on stock market returns from about 8 percent down to 6, the standard rate used by corporations in their calculations. This would mean telling a state like Pennsylvania, which has accumulated a 9.23 percent return in the stock market over the last 25 years (as of February 2010), that its 8 percent investment assumption is too high.

This is all irrelevant. We’re not saying that when states engage in risky investments, teachers then are at risk of not being paid their pensions. The problem is precisely the opposite: Teacher pensions are guaranteed by states that don’t go out of business. But that doesn’t make the risk magically go away. The risk just ends up being borne by the taxpayer. So if a state decides to blow all of its pension money gambling at a horse race, the teachers will still get their pensions, but taxpayers will suddenly find themselves paying higher taxes to make up the shortfall (or else seeing huge budget cuts to other important state services).

In the last sentence, Aldeman cites a document put out by the Pennsylvania pension system, but that document actually proves our point. The Pennsylvania pension system may have made an average of 9.23% per year for the past 25 years, but they still predict that looking forward, there will still have to be “significant and perhaps prohibitive tax increases at the State and/or Local levels.”

Moreover, to focus on the 25-year rate of return, as Aldeman does, ignores three things: 1) past performance is no guarantee of future success; 2) the PA pension system now has less assets on Dec. 31, 2009 than on June 30, 2004, which means it lost money over a 5.5 year period; and 3) this kind of variability (i.e., risk) requires taxpayers to pay extra when investments are disappointing for years on end.

The problem with Pennsylvania, as with many other states, is that when times were flush (the late 1990s or the mid-2000s), legislators did not have the foresight to let pension systems accumulate some savings for possible tough times ahead. Instead, they decided to lower contributions to pension systems and/or increase pension benefits, all on the assumption that high stock market returns would magically pay for it all. But when the stock market falls, the pension systems are left with extra liabilities that no one ever paid for, and the risk ultimately rests with the taxpayer.

It’s a heads-I-win, tails-you-lose system. That’s why taxpayers need state pension systems to use an accounting method that more properly and honestly accounts for all of the risk that they’re shifting onto us.


The States Are Concealing Teacher Pension Costs of ONE TRILLION DOLLARS!

April 13, 2010

(Guest post by Greg Forster)

A new study by Josh Barro and Stuart Buck, co-sponsored by the Foundation for Educational Choice and the Manhattan Institute, finds that states have total teacher pension liabilities of ONE TRILLION DOLLARS!

These days that doesn’t sound like much, does it? We’re getting to the point where raising an alarm about ONE TRILLION DOLLARS is a little like holding the world to ransom for a measly million.

But check out some other points from the study:

  • These teacher pension liabilities are systematically concealed from the public. The states claim they’re on the hook for “only” $332 billion.
  • Not surprisingly, these concealed liabilities aren’t properly funded. Every pension fund is in shortfall – California alone by $100 billion.
  • The funding shortfalls aren’t trivial. The five worst states (by percentage) are less than 40 percent funded. Only five plans in the whole country are 75 percent funded.

The logic is simple: extravegant teacher pension promises cost nothing to make, and the people who make the promises will mostly have moved on to other things by the time the gigantic costs come due. The due date can be held off by dishonest accounting – you don’t need to put a trillion dollars into the pension fund if you just pretend you don’t owe a trillion dollars. When the chickens come home to roost, those in power can shrug their shoulders and blame the irresponsibility of previous administrations. And where will the guilty parties be by then?

It’s the perfect crime.


Lunch With Max and Warwick

February 15, 2010

I had lunch today with Max Brantley of the Arkansas Times and Warwick Sabin of the Oxford American (and formerly of the Arkansas Times) as well as my colleague, Josh McGee.  I have to say that I really enjoyed it. 

Max can be harsh and opinionated but I have a soft spot for harsh and opinionated folks, sometimes being one myself.  And at least with Max you always know where he stands. 

I also think all four of us agreed much more than we disagreed.  We agreed in deploring the lack of quality opportunities in education, particularly for disadvantaged students.  We agreed that some people working in our schools need to find a different profession.  We agreed that we should figure out ways to get rock star teachers with high pay.  We agreed that schools ought to have high standards and offer rewards to students for meeting those standards. 

We disagreed about expanding choice and competition in education.  Max and Warwick seem to view education as a zero-sum game where some schools can do better only by taking away kids from other schools, which are made worse as a result.  I think there’s a good amount of evidence to support the view that schools rise to the challenge and improve when they are faced with greater competition from an expanded set of choices.

I also agreed with them in admitting that I have lost my enthusiasm for merit pay.  I still think there are some positive effects from merit pay, or as I put it in a report that Max links to on his blog: “The evidence that is available, however, provides some grounds for moderate optimism about merit pay.”  I just don’t think the moderate benefits are worth the enormous energy that the policy consumes as well as the potential for cheating or other undesired effects.  As, I told Max, Warwick, and Josh at lunch, the most effective form of merit pay is getting rid of bad teachers.  That would make a much bigger difference than the potential to earn a 1% or 2%  bonus.

I don’t know why I’ve been so slow to learn this lesson, but it is generally a good idea to sit down with people with whom you’ve had public disagreements because you may discover that your disagreements are less than everyone thought.  Yes, they are still there and still important, but we can also make progress by focusing on the ideas we share.


Question for Leo — How Long Will It Take For an NEA Correction?

January 29, 2010

Since the teacher union flacks have a hard time changing the cue cards from which they read, we have a question for Leo:  How long will it take until the NEA issues a correction for the obvious error committed in the video above and in the press release here?

In case you need to catch up, the NEA issued a press release claiming “Inflation over the past decade has outpaced teachers’ salaries in every single state across the country…”  The only problem is that their own report shows that teacher salaries actually rose at a real rate of 3.4% nationwide over the last decade and at faster than the rate of inflation in 36 states.  Read more about it here.

We’ll start our new series, NEA Correction Watch, tomorrow to count the days until they admit the error.

UPDATE — I’ve been corresponding by email with Celeste F. Busser, the NEA’s Senior Public Relations Specialist, about this error.  I have to say she has been very responsive.  In fact, she just emailed me to say that the NEA’s research department has “confirmed their mistake.”  She has altered the web site of the press release to say that inflation has outpaced salary increases in 15 states (rather than every state) over the past decade.  And she says that she will send a corrected press release to everyone who received the original one. 

Yes, the NEA is still putting their heavy spin on these facts, but at least they are getting the facts right.  I feel a little guilty about expecting the worst with regard to their issuing a correction.  But my guilt is reduced somewhat by the fact that they do not appear to acknowledge any error and are just replacing the erroneous information as if it never happened.  That’s not quite what they should be doing.


The Ministry of Truth Speaks

January 29, 2010

A press release from the National Education Association landed in my inbox this morning with the alarming headline: “Teachers Take ‘Pay Cut’ as Inflation Outpaces Salaries.  Average teachers’ salaries declined over the past decade” 

The release goes on to say: “Inflation over the past decade has outpaced teachers’ salaries in every single state across the country, according to the National Education Association’s update to the annual report Rankings and Estimates: Rankings of the States 2009 and Estimates of School Statistics 2010. ‘Public schoolteachers across the nation are continuing to lose spending power for themselves and their families in an already struggling economy,’ said NEA President Dennis Van Roekel.”

The only problem is that this is not what the data in the NEA report actually show.  In Table C-14 “Percentage Change in Average Salaries of Public School Teachers 1998-99 to 2008-09 (Constant $)” we see that salaries increased by 3.4% nationwide over the last decade after adjusting for inflation.  The increase in average salary outpaced inflation in 36 states, which is very different from the claim that  ”Inflation over the past decade has outpaced teachers’ salaries in every single state across the country…”  Check for yourself, the table is on p. 20 of the report, which is p. 38 of the pdf.

I can’t find a single table or figure in the report that would justify the headline and claims in the press release.  But when the Ministry of Truth speaks who are you supposed to believe — them or your lying eyes?

I should add that total compensation for public school teachers has risen much more rapidly than just salary because of the rising value of benefits.  In addition, the numbers the NEA provides are the increase in the average salary, not the increase for the average teacher.  The huge increase in new teachers over the last decade who begin with lower starting salaries makes the rise in average salary smaller than the average raise that each individual teacher has received.

Even with these distortions, the report is a treasure trove of interesting information.  We learn that the average teacher in 2008-09 was paid $54,319, excluding the value of health benefits, generous (and guaranteed) pensions, and exceptionally high job security (See Table C-11).  We also learn that the average school revenue per pupil was $11,681 in 2008-09, up from $11,432 the year before  (See Tables F-1 and F-2).  And total instructional staff has increased by 13.6% over the last decade to 3,716,541, with increases in educators employed every year — no recession here.  (See Table 3.2 on p. 75 of text and p. 93 of pdf.)

UPDATE:  Here is the NEA press release with a video from NEA president, Dennis Van Roekel, repeating the erroneous claim.  It is obvious from the video and an email exchange I’ve been having with the NEA press representative that they compared the constant dollar percentage increase to the increase in the rate of inflation and found that no state had a real increase that was higher than the 29.6% rate of inflation over the past decade.  The problem with this is that the constant dollar percentage increase adjusts for inflation.  The claim of the press release is based on an obvious error.


Carrying Coals to Newcastle

January 6, 2010

Stuart Buck and I have a piece on National Review Online this morning about how money to address unemployment is being devoted to education.  The curious thing is that education (and health care) are the only major sectors of the economy that have added jobs over the last two years while every other sector has lost more than 7 million jobs. 

Fixing unemployment by spending an additional $23 billion on teacher salaries is like carrying coals to Newcastle.  I’d much rather that Congress carry Newcastle beer.  Hmmmmm.  Beer.  Then at least we wouldn’t mind so much their blowing our money to address a problem in the only sector where it doesn’t exist.


Incentives and Motivation

December 9, 2009

Surely we can find a happy medium?

(Guest post by Greg Forster)

I’ve just read a fascinating article – Frederick Herzberg’s “One More Time: How Do You Motivate Employees?” from the Harvard Business Review. The 1987 version, an update of the original 1968 article of the same title, went on to become HBR’s most requested reprint ever.

I can see why. Partly it’s the humor value, which  is considerable. “What is the simplest, surest, and most direct way of getting someone to do something?” Herzberg’s first answer: the KITA. (Hint: KIT stands for “Kick In The.” Herzberg claims original authorship of this acronym, and given that the article first appeared in 1968 I believe him.) The KITA comes in many forms, including what Herzberg dubs the “negative physical KITA,” i.e. the literal kick. But there are numerous problems with using the negative physical KITA to motivate employees, not least that “it directly stimulates the autonomic system, and this often results in negative feedback.” Translation: the subject may kick back.

 

Negative autonomic feedback

But Herzberg also makes a substantial contribution to organizational theory, one that’s forced me to do some new thinking on the regular debates we have on the role of incentives in education.

After a brief discussion of the negative physical KITA, Herzberg moves on to what he dubs the “negative psychological KITA,” i.e. making people feel bad unless they do something. The advantages of the negative psychological KITA over the negative physical KITA are considerable, including: “since the number of psychological pains that a person can feel is almost infinite, the direction and site possibilities of the KITA are increased many times”; “the person administering the kick can manage to be above it all and let the system accomplish the dirty work”; and “finally, if the employee does complain, he or she can always be accused of being paranoid; there is no tangible evidence of an actual attack.”

But it is pretty clear to most people that both types of negative KITA do not really produce what we usually call “motivation.” What they produce is movement. The subject moves, but does not become motivated. Hence – and this is the important part – the method is of limited effectiveness. As long as you keep applying KITAs the subject will keep moving, but only as long as you keep kicking and only as far as you kick. To be really effective, you need to do something to get the subject to keep moving – produce ongoing motivation.

Hence most organizations, sensibly enough, turn to positive incentives and discourage managers from using negative ones. And here things get really interesting. Herzberg argues that most of the positive incentives normally used in an attempt to produce motivation are really very similar in their outcomes to negative KITAs – producing movement rather than motivation. The subject subjectively experiences them as positive rather than negative, but objectively the result in terms of work output is similar. You’re just pulling rather than pushing. The subject only moves as long and as far as you pull. Herzberg thus gives these incentives the somewhat paradoxical label “positive KITAs.”

A positive KITA?

Herzberg’s examples of positive KITAs include pay and benefit increases, reduction in work hours, and improved workplace relations (i.e. communications and “sensitivity” training for managers, morale surveys and “worker suggestion” plans).

The positive KITA, Herzberg argues, despite being ubiquitous in the business world, is actually not much more effective than the negative – and it’s a lot more expensive. This is especially true since positive KITAs (unlike negative ones) must be progressive. If you give the worker a $500 bonus this year, when last year you gave him a $1,000 bonus, this objectively positive action will actually be subjectively experienced as negative.

Herzberg argues that a real, self-sustaining motivation can be produced in employees by something he calls “job enrichment.” That sounds like something the warm and fuzzy folks would advocate, but Herzberg actually spends a good deal of time taking the warm and fuzzy folks to task for their inanity. (This provides much of the humor value. It’s also historically interesting – it’s amazing to see how far the warm and fuzzy disease had already spread by 1968.) What Herzberg is arguing for is something more serious than the label implies.

His underlying psycological and organizational theory is a bit too much to recopy it all here, but here’s a capsule summary. He and others did a large number of empirical studies and found that job satisfaction and job dissatisfaction didn’t usually come from the same sources. For example, having a jerk for a boss produces job dissatisfaction, but having a nice boss usually does not produce any job satisfaction. Niceness in bosses simply prevents workers from feeling dissatisfied; it doesn’t actually make the job satisfying.

The key insight to get here is that removing dissatisfaction doesn’t produce any satisfaction, and highly effective motivation comes from producing satisfaction rather than from removing dissatisfaction.

His meta-analysis of the empirical research finds that pay and benefits, job security, company policy, working conditions and on-the-job relationships are all normally associated with levels of dissatisfaction, but rarely with levels of satisfaction. On the other hand, levels of satisfaction are associated with achievement, recognition for achievement, responsibility, advancement, aspects of the work itself, and development of one’s capacities to do the work.

Herzberg’s idea of “job enrichment” is to increase worker’s experiences of the things that provide high levels of satisfaction. Give workers more responsibility and more opportunity to achieve, and then recognize success – most importantly with advancement that brings still more responsibility and opportunity for achievement. The converse of this is that failure must also be “recognized” - primarily through withholding advancement and responsibility rather than through negative KITAs.

I find his theory and evidence persuasive. And it has helped me see a little more clearly the underlying logic behind some objections to education policies like merit pay.

Yet I don’t think this analysis actually does take anything away from the case for merit pay, still less from the case for other education reforms like school choice. If anything, it makes them stronger. And taking account of this analysis will help us make the case more effectively.

Some of the objections to merit pay are based on an essentially Herzbergian conception of worker motivation. Smart people don’t deny that money plays some role in motivating people to do more work. But even among those who don’t advocate touchy-feely romantic delusions about teachers who are angelic beings with no connection to the material world, there is a lot of skepticism that you can get them to work all that much harder just for “a few extra sheckels” (as one of the more sensible critics once put it in a comment here on this blog).

Yet consider what would have to happen for Herzbergian “job enrichment” to occur in the teaching profession. First of all, you’d need an objective measurement of achievement. Then you’d need to give teachers autonomy in the classroom and hold them accountable for results on that metric. And for the accountability to take the form of advancement and increased autonomy (and accountability), you’d need to remove the one-size-fits-all union scale and work rules that dominate the profession.

In other words, it’s not so much the pay that makes merit pay worth trying, as it is the fact that merit pay creates tangible recognition for success. The current system seems almost deliberately crafted to deny teachers as many opportunities for satisfaction as possible. Merit pay is an attempt to create more such opportunities.

It’s worth noting that Michelle Rhee’s proposed two-track system in DC labels the old, union-dominated track the “red” track and the new, merit-based track the “green” track. Rhee understands that what she’s offering isn’t just, or even primarily, more money. She’s offering DC teachers their professional pride.

But school choice looks even better by this light. Test scores would be a limited basis for creating opportunities for Herzbergian satisfaction. On the other hand, if your objective measurement of job performance is parental feedback, the sky’s the limit. In this context it’s worth noting that Herzberg says the only meaningful measure of job performance is ultimately the client or customer’s satisfaction; using any other measure is taking your eye off the ball.

You could even combine the two to create a truly graduated scale of autonomy and accountability. New teachers could be required to use a standard curriculum and be evaluated on how their students – all types of students, not just the rich white ones – progress in basic skills. (That, of course, is the real primary function of test-based accountability – ensuring that kids who face more challenges aren’t just warehoused for twelve years while the rich white kids get an education.) Teachers who prove they can deliver the goods on reading and math for students of all backgrounds could then be given more classroom autonomy and evaluated based on parental feedback rather than test scores. Freedom from test-based accountability is the payoff for proving you can teach basic skills reliably. Schools could set up any number of intermediate arrangements in between “pure” test scores and “pure” parental feedback, with teachers earning more and more recognition and autonomy as they prove more and more their ability to teach effectively.

Looking back at my previous posts on teacher autonomy and satisfaction levels in public v. private schools, the poisonous influence of one-size-fits-all pay scales, and the union-driven destruction of the teaching profession, I can see this is really the framework I’ve been trying to articulate all along. The unions keep bleating about how teachers should be treated like professionals. I agree. They should have autonomy, like professionals – and they should be held accountable for results.


Is Percentage-Based Compensation Unethical?

November 2, 2009

Teacher unions aren’t the only ones who have a problem with linking compensation to performance.  The Association of Fundraising Professionals (AFP), the interest group representing the people who raise money for non-profit organizations, has declared that it is unethical. 

As the AFP’s standards of ethics puts it: “Members shall not accept compensation or enter into a contract that is based on a percentage of contributions; nor shall members accept finder’s fees or contingent fees.”  According to the AFP, paying fund-raisers a percentage of what they bring in is not just a bad idea, it is wrong.

I have been a member of three non-profit organization boards and at each one the board was told that it could not pay a fundraiser a percentage of money brought in.  Instead, we were told that we were ethically bound to pay a fundraiser a flat fee and hope that the person would raise significantly more than the flat fee.  I must also add that at each one of these organizations the fund-raiser we hired barely covered his/her flat fee and the non-profit came away with virtually nothing. 

I have never understood why percentage-based compensation for non-profit fund-raisers is unethical.  I understand that it is in the AFP and their members’ interest to declare that it is unethical.  Doing so almost always stifles discussion on boards about what is the best way to compensate fund-raisers.  It also shifts all risk to the organization from the fund-raiser and assures them a profit.

The AFP has gone as far as proposing that Congress pass a law forbidding non-profits from using percentage-based funding for fund-raisers.  The argument about why this is such an awful practice that it needs to be outlawed is flimsy at best.  First, the AFP claims: “Percentage-based compensation sets up a conflict of interest. A consultant’s desire for personal gain shouldn’t trump the broader social interests of the organization.”  But it is not clear why paying fund-raisers a percentage of what they bring-in sets up a conflict of interest.  If anything, paying fund-raisers a percentage aligns the interests of fund-raisers and organizations by providing the fund-raiser with an incentive to raise more money, which is exactly what most organizations also want. 

If percentage-based compensation creates a conflict of interest, why should that be any more of a problem for fund-raisers in the non-profit sector than among sales-people in the for-profit sector?  As the AFP concedes: “Percentage-based compensation methods are generally legal. They are also common practice in the commercial sector.” 

Every objection that the AFP raises to percentage-based compensation could apply equally well to the profit-seeking sector.  And each of these problems can be successfully managed.  If they cannot, people in the profit-seeking sector would avoid percentage-based compensation as unproductive, but almost no one would denounce it as unethical.

Here are the objections that the AFP has that they say makes percentage-based compensation in the non-profit world unethical:

What if a consultant were to receive compensation based on an unsolicited gift or on an annual contribution that commenced before and continues after the consultant leaves? Such reward without merit would create resentment among organization staff and donors. Since many contributions are the result of teamwork among organization staff and consultants, no one person should be able to cart off the rewards of that effort. Consultants motivated by personal gain could unduly pressure a donor to make a contribution, without consideration of the donor’s wishes or timetable. And if the practice became widely known, the organization’s reputation and credibility could suffer irreparable harm.

Sales also come to businesses “that commenced before and continues after the [salesperson] leaves.”  Businesses that use percentage-based compensation devise ways of assigning responsibility for sales (some of which may be  arbitray) or they exclude certain sales.  These problems are not unique to non-profits and have been addressed in the profit-seeking sector.

It is also true that “many [sales] are the result of teamwork among organization staff and consultants, no one person should be able to cart off the rewards of that effort.”  Again, these are problems that also exist in the businessworld and solutions have been developed.

Lastly, it is also true that “[salespeople] motivated by personal gain could unduly pressure a [customer] to make a [purchase], without consideration of the [customer]‘s wishes or timetable.”  This is also not a unique or intractable problem in the businessworld.

In the end, the declaration that percentage-based compensation for fund-raisers just feels like self-interested bullying.  Non-profits may choose not to pay fund-raisers on a percentage basis, but they should feel free to consider whatever way would best serve the organization without being told that they are behaving “unethically” without any valid reason.

I’m thinking about starting a new organization, “People United for Jay P. Greene.”  One of our first actions is likely to be to declare it unethical not to give Jay P. Greene a million dollars.  We’d have about as much reason for saying so as the AFP has for its “ethics.”


Getting Less for Less

October 20, 2009

Hawaii decided to fix their budget shortfall by eliminating 17 days from this school year in exchange for an 8 percent reduction in teacher salaries.  That means Hawaii public school kids will spend 163 days in school compared to about 180 for most kids nationwide.

Eighty-one percent of all teachers approved the deal, which leaves “teacher vacation, nine paid holidays and six teacher planning days … untouched.”  Teacher benefits, including pension and health benefits also remain unchanged. In addition, “[t]he new agreement also guarantees no layoffs for two years and postpones the implementation of random drug testing for teachers.”  

So, teachers work 9.4% fewer days for 8% less pay, full benefits and two more years of guaranteed employment.  It’s not a bad deal… as long as you are a teacher.  Kids will be shortchanged, parents have to scramble for daycare, and the state gives away more than it gets in savings.

The only risk for the teacher union in doing this is that we might discover that student achievement is unaffected by 17 fewer days of school.  If that’s the case why not cut 34 days of school for 16% less pay?  Or maybe get rid of it altogether.


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